I Introduction
For most scholars working in the field of international political economy (IPE), the 1950s is a forgotten decade. Sandwiched between the well-trawled period of postwar reconstruction and the so-called 'golden age' of the 1960s, the decade is seen almost exclusively through the lens of the Suez crisis, the Treaty of Rome and the consolidation of bipolar Cold War politics. There has been relatively little academic interest in charting the development of international economic relations in the 1950s, and this is particularly true with respect to international monetary policy. As a result, most IPE studies tend to assume that during this period the world economy was governed by the rules and institutions established in accordance with the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. Although it is often pointed out that the practice of the 'system' diverged from the theory of its founders, it is nevertheless a cardinal assumption of the discipline (and of political science and international relations more generally) that Bretton Woods operated quietly and effectively in the 1950s to usher in a period of unrivalled growth and prosperity in the world economy.
1 This study shows, however, that there is little evidence to support this assumption.
The inauguration of the IMF and the International Bank at Savannah, Georgia in March 1946, was followed not by the smooth unfolding of 'embedded liberalism', 2 but by waves of economic crisis which forced the 'system' to shut down in August 1947. The multilateral ideals of Keynes and White were sidelined as European economies were kick-started by dollar aid in a world context dominated by discriminatory blocs and bilateral trade and payments agreements. By 1951, as the consequences of Korean rearmament began to bite, the world economy faced its most severe postwar test. The Bretton Woods institutions were dormant and currencies inconvertible. The future of the world economy would be decided not by the Fund and the GATT, but by governments in London, Paris and Washington struggling to correct the critical weaknesses in the world economic structure. This study presents a detailed, archive-based account of the key aspects of international monetary relations in the 1950s -and in particular in the period of the dormancy of Bretton Woods, 1951-58. The restoration of general currency convertibility, on 29 December 1958, represents for many the rebirth of the Bretton Woods 'system' and the dawn of the modern global economy. However, whilst there are numerous studies of the decline of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s, the move to convertibility which led to the resuscitation of the 'system' is almost totally unresearched within the field of IPE.
3 To make good this deficiency, and to begin to lay bare the dynamics of the international economic system in the 1960s, this study focuses specifically on the conditions surrounding the move to sterling convertibility in the context of wider Anglo-American economic relations. With over 50 per cent of world trade still conducted in sterling in the early 1950s, struggles over British policy assumed particular significance in the international arena and drove broader policy shifts towards the convertibility of other key European currencies. Towards the end of the decade, however, the limits of British leadership in international monetary affairs, as in international politics more broadly, were becoming all too obvious and the final push to convertibility came not from the British but from the French and German governments.
At the heart of this book is the claim that in the midst of economic crisis in February 1952, the British government had a unique opportunity to take a bold, almost revolutionary, step in the external field which would have transformed the international political economy (through the abolition of the fixed rate system, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Payments Union) and restructured Britain's domestic economy to tackle the long-standing productivity, export and labour market problems. The move was discussed under the codename Operation Robot. Seen by many economic historians simply as a Bank plan to achieve sterling convertibility, its real significance lay in its political impact on international economic relations and on Britain's domestic political economy. Arising in the Bank of England and the Overseas Finance Division of the Treasury, and supported to the last by the Chancellor Rab Butler, Robot was, above all else, a unilateral British plan of action. On Budget day, 11 March 1952, Butler would announce that sterling was to be made convertible (for non-residents of the Sterling Area) on a floating rate of exchange and that sterling balances (net sterling liabilities of the UK) would, to all intents and purposes, be frozen and funded into long-term Treasury bonds. The pound would fall, import prices would rise and unemployment, it was judged, would in all probability shoot over the one million mark (from an existing figure of around 400,000). This would 'free-up' the labour market, encourage economic adjustment in line with market forces, and the exchange rate would 'take the strain' as payments came back into balance. Soft markets would disappear and British exports would be forced to compete with dollar goods. Inter-
